Harper's Uncanny Ability to Maintain his Political Fortunes

In reading Lawrence Martin's Harperland, I was struck by how many times Prime Minister Harper and his operatives have had their political skins saved, not just by their own Machiavellian machinations, but by external events.

Take, for example, Harper's first unnecessary prorogation of Parliament in order to avoid a confidence vote that would have surely toppled his government. Having badly miscalculated the political opposition to ending public subsidies for all parties, a measure he included in Finance Minister Jim Flarherty's 2008 economic update, he faced the prospect of a coalition of the Liberals and the NDP, with a promise of support for at least 18 months from the Bloc Quebecois, to form a new government after a confidence vote in the House. According to Martin, Harper was ready to concede defeat having made a rare but huge tactical error. But fate intervened to save him.

Although not part of the coalition, the Bloc Quebecois leader, Giles Duceppe, was invited by Dion and Layton to take part in a public signing to demonstrate their ability to work together and thus form a replacement government without an election, something quite constitutionally legitimate. However, the inclusion of Duceppe gave Harper the opening he needed, whereby he went on a campaign to denounce this unholy alliance with 'separatists' as an attempt to 'highjack democracy.'

Harper was successful in his propaganda blitz and the rest, as they say, is history. His visit to Governor General Michelle Jean secured him the intended result: a prorogation of Parliament, during which the idea of a coalition lost its momentum, largely due to the public outrage against it that Harper had fuelled.

Similarly, in 2010, to avoid a showdown in Parliament over his refusal to turn over Afghan detainee documents that many believe would have shown that his Goverment had known that those Afghans turned over to the authorities by the Canadian military faced torture, he once more prorogued Parliament, this time on the pretext of 'recalibrating' his Government's agenda. Initially, this backfired on the Prime Minister, as Canadians expressed their outrage through protests, Facebook petitions, etc. But then two things happened: the devastating earthquake in Haiti, and the opening of the Winter Olympics in B.C. The ensuing public diversion of attention allowed the Harper regime to dodge another bullet.

There are numerous other examples in the book, but what does all of this suggest? That Harper is capable of using any opportunity for political benefit, which leads me to predict the following:

Given that he has already used the terrible recent tragedy in Japan to suggest now is not the time for an election, there is little doubt in my mind that he will use Canada's entry into the Libyan conflict to do two things. He will again suggest that a time of war, as he has called it, is not the time for political games by the opposition parties in trying to engineer an election; experienced and stable leadership in paramount in these perilous times. Also, he will take the opportunity to talk about how this sudden incursion into Libya demonstrates the need for up-to-the-date military aircraft, and so his Government's decision to spend untold billions on the 65 F-35 jets is yet another example of his wise and prescient leadership.

Once more, external events will likely save this Prime Minister's hide.