More on Iran's 'Nuclear Program'

Yesterday I wrote a post linking to an article by Gwynne Dyer that suggests the rush to judgement about Iran's alleged nuclear-weapons' program needs to include the facts and not just recycled data and hysteria.

In a similar vein, I recommend a piece called Another nuclear shell game, written by Ramesh Thakur, the director of the Centre for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament at Australian National University. Published in today's Toronto Star, like Dyer, Thakur warns that there is no new evidence of nuclear-weapons development in Iraq, despite what the International Atomic Energy Agency is warning.

Says Thakur:

The new report lists efforts by Iran’s military to procure nuclear-related and dual-use material and equipment; to develop ways and means of producing undeclared nuclear material; to tap into clandestine networks for obtaining weapons-related information and documentation; and to work on an indigenous nuclear weapons design.

Importantly, however, all these activities took place before 2003. There is no fresh revelation. Even the pre-2003 assessment referred to weapons-relevant research by Iranian scientists, not to constructing a bomb factory. Hence the startlingly wimpish conclusion: There are “indications that some activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing.”

Of special significance for the critical thinker trying to objectively analyse the information is the fact that the leadership of the International Atomic Energy Agency has changed. Despite the fact that it is supposed to be a neutral agency, as it was under the leadership of Mohamed ElBaradei and chief weapons inspector Hans Blix who, you may recall during the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, found no evidence of weapons of mass destruction there, the agency is now run by Yukio Amano, described in the article as Washington’s choice because he was “solidly in the U.S. court” on Iran, according to a U.S. diplomatic cable.

As if demonstrating his allegiance to his political master, Amano adds that there is no conclusive proof that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful and he “has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program.”

How do you prove a negative? For U.S. and Israeli forces, the answer is a convenient, "You can't."