Downfall: The Case Against Boeing

 I will be the first to admit that my viewing tastes are unusual for a man my age. I enjoy the off-kilter, the unusual, even the bizarre in movie/streaming fare.  And although I never watch television during the day, that still amounts to both wasted, and some well-rewarded, hours. 

Sometimes, my tastes are more down to earth, so to speak, and such was my experience the other night when I watched a riveting documentary recommended by my brother-in-law entitled Downfall: The Case Against Boeing. Although made in 2022 and focussing on the crashes of the 747-Max 8, it sheds incredible light on the current safety issues plaguing Boeing, and in that regard is must-viewing.

Here is a trailer for the film, and I am happy to report the entire documentary can be found for free at Daily Motion. It is also available on Netflix.

How does a company go from one admired worldwide for its sterling safety record to one where two catastrophic crashes occurred within five months of each other? The answer is surprisingly simply: corporate greed. But the real story is how Boeing succumbed to such venality.

It began in 1997, when Boeing and McDonnell Douglas merged. Unfortunately, in that merger, the culture of the latter ultimately supplanted that of the former, whose decisions had been determined largely by engineers, their guiding principles innovation and safety. A comprehensive detailing of the results of this merger can be seen in this Atlantic article.

The film outlines how, in order to wrest sales supremacy from its new rival Airbus, Boeing embarked on an enhancement of its 737s, in operation since the late sixties. Speed, rather than safety, was of the essence. Because the new Max-8 required an alteration in the angle of the engine, the chances of a stall after takeoff, as the craft was ascending, increased. To counteract that possibility, they developed the MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System), a flight stabilizing feature. 

Because things were being done on the cheap by this time, there were two major problems with the system: there was only one sensor (which could be easily disabled by a bird strike, for example) in the nose of the plane to measure its angle of attack as it ascended, and NO ONE was trained in its use. The big selling point for the Max-8, one that allowed it to regain sales supremacy, was the assurance that no flight simulator training was needed for MCAS. Such training is very costly to airlines, given the time needed to allow pilots to become proficient. This turned out to be a fatal false economy, and like a malevolent ghost in the machine, MCAS sent hundreds of people to their deaths.

The two crashes that ensued within five months of each other, killing a total of 346 people, were entirely avoidable. Why was nothing done after the first crash to remedy the situation? False assurances and bureaucratic inertia are part of the answer.

For the rest, you will have to watch the film. I may, in my next post, write about the ongoing fallout of the merger that now has the FAA threatening on-site oversight because of the latest symptom of laxity, the door-plug blowout much in the news these days.